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WARM-GLOW VERSUS  COLD-PRICKLE:  THE  EFFECTS  OF 
POSITIVE  AND  NEGATIVE  FRAMING  ON  COOPERATION 
IN  EXPERIMENTS* 
JAMES  ANDREONI 
Experiments  on privately provided public goods generally  find that subjects are 
far  more  cooperative  than  predicted,  while  experiments  on  oligopolies  and  the 
commons  almost  always  obtain  the  Nash-equilibrium  predictions,  despite  being 
very similar games. This paper examines  whether  this difference could be due to the 
fact that with  public goods there  is a positive  externality,  while with the others  the 
externality  is  negative.  The  result  of  the  experiments  is  that  subjects  are  more 
willing  to  cooperate  when  the  externality  is  positive,  even  though  the  potential 
outcomes  are  the  same.  This  suggests  a  behavioral  asymmetry  between  the 
warm-glow of doing something  good and cold-prickle of doing something  bad. 
INTRODUCTION 
The fact that  a large fraction  of people voluntarily  contribute 
to public goods,  despite  strong  incentives  to free ride, has  been  a 
long-standing  puzzle  for economists.  This  is true  for economists 
studying  public goods in the  real world, such  as charitable  giving, 
and  for  researchers  looking  at  voluntary  contributions  in  the 
laboratory. In both settings  people appear to give too much.' 
This paper focuses  on voluntary  public goods provision  in the 
laboratory.  The  lack  of  free  riding  in  experiments  presents  an 
*I would like to thank Paul Brown, Robyn Dawes, and Charles Holt for valuable 
comments  and conversations,  and one of the  editors  and an anonymous  referee  of 
this Journal  for many helpful  suggestions.  I am also grateful  for financial  support 
from  the  National  Science  Foundation  and  from  an Alfred  P.  Sloan  Foundation 
Research Fellowship. 
1.  See Davis and Holt [1992] and Ledyard [1994] for summaries  of public goods 
experiments,  and  see  Andreoni  [1988a]  for  a  discussion  of  the  puzzle  regarding 
public goods outside the laboratory. 
?  1995 by the President and Fellows of Harvard  College  and the Massachusetts  Institute of 
Technology. 
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especially  interesting  challenge  for economists.  First,  free riding is 
a dominant-strategy  Nash equilibrium  in these  experiments,  so the 
prediction  for  free  riding  is  particularly  sharp.  Second,  these 
results  are  in  strong  contrast  to  other  experiments  in  which 
subjects'  choices  create externalities  for each  other.  For instance, 
oligopoly  experiments  and  common-pool  resource  experiments, 
among others,  generally produce Nash equilibria in the laboratory, 
even with  relatively  small numbers  of subjects  and few iterations. 
Hence,  there  is an important  collection  of other  experiments  with 
externalities  that,  unlike  public  goods experiments,  tends  to con- 
firm the Nash equilibrium  prediction. 
One  main  difference  between  these  experiments  and  public 
goods experiments  is that  in the public goods experiments  subjects 
are asked to generate  positive  externalities,  while  in all the  other 
experiments  subjects  generate  negative  externalities.  It is possible 
that  this  difference  alone could be generating  at least  some  of the 
gap between  these  two bodies of experimental  results. 
This  paper  will  examine  the  effects  of positive  and  negative 
framing on cooperation. This is done by considering two experimen- 
tal  conditions.  The positive-frame  condition  is the  regular  public 
goods game that experimental  economists  have studied in the past. 
This  frames  the  subject's  choice  as contributing  to a public good, 
which  will  have  a positive  benefit  to  other  subjects.  The  second 
condition  is  the  negative-frame  condition.  The  incentives  of this 
game are identical  to the  positive-frame  condition.  However,  this 
time  the  subjects'  choice  is  framed  as purchasing  a private  good 
that,  since the opportunity  cost is the purchase  of the public good, 
makes the other subjects worse off. The result of this experiment  is 
that  subjects  in  the  positive-frame  condition  are  much  more 
cooperative  than  subjects  in  the  negative-frame  condition.  This 
indicates  that  much  of the  cooperation  observed  in  public  goods 
experiments  is due to framing, and that the warm-glow  of creating 
a positive externality  appears to be stronger than the cold-prickle of 
creating  a negative  externality.  Intuitively,  this  result  appears to 
match well with what is observed in the real world. Competition  is 
thought  to work well, even with relatively  small numbers  of firms, 
and  many  common-pool  resources  must  be  tightly  managed.  In 
addition,  most  fund-raising  activities  for  charities  appeal  to  the 
benefits  to be gained by contributing,  while few point to the losses 
due to  free  riding.  Given  the  appeal  of this  result,  such  a strong 
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about economic behavior, the design of institutions,  and experimen- 
tal methodology. 
Section  II discusses  the differences  between  experiments  with 
positive and negative  externalities.  Section III describes the experi- 
ment conducted in this paper. Section IV presents  the results  of the 
experiment,  and  Section  V  discusses  these  results.  Section  VI 
compares the results  with  other framing  phenomena,  and Section 
VII concludes. 
II.  POSITIVE  AND NEGATIVE  FRAMING 
The standard public goods experiment  gives subjects a budget 
of tokens  that they can place in a public good or a private good. The 
payoff function  is linear and is designed so that purchasing  only the 
private  good  is  the  dominant  strategy  Nash  equilibrium,  while 
contributing  all tokens  in the public good is the  symmetric  Pareto 
efficient  allocation.  Figure  I illustrates  a representative  sample  of 
results  from  linear  public  goods  experiments.  While  changing 
group  size  and  marginal  returns  to  the  public  good  affects  out- 
comes,  the  general  pattern  remains  the  same: about  50 percent  of 
tokens  are put into the public good in round 1, and 20 to 40 percent 
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are  by  round  10.  While  choices  seem  to  be  tending  toward  the 
equilibrium  prediction,  the  convergence  seems  too  slow  to  fully 
support the theory. 
These results  can be compared with Plott's  [1983] findings. He 
conducted  a  double  auction  in  which  each  contract  transacted 
generated  a negative  externality  on all traders.  In the  experiment 
this  externality  was referred to as "damage" created by a transac- 
tion;  after  each  trading  period  subjects  count  the  number  of 
contracts  and calculate  damage  on a table that  reflects  increasing 
marginal  costs.  Plott  found  that  traders  basically  ignore  the 
externality,  and within two or three periods are trading at the Nash 
equilibrium.  Similarly,  Walker  and  Gardner  [1992]  and  Walker, 
Gardner,  and  Ostrom  [1990]  looked  at  common-pool  resources. 
Here  subjects  can  invest  in  an  asset  whose  average  return  is  a 
decreasing  function  of  the  total  invested.  They  find  rapid  and 
complete  depletion  of the resource.  In many instances  the rates  of 
depletion  exceed the  Nash-equilibrium  prediction.  As pointed  out 
by  Davis  and  Holt  [1992],  the  incentives  in  experiments  on  the 
commons  are  identical  to  Cournot  oligopoly  experiments,  which 
generate  similar  results  in groups  of three  or more.2 Likewise,  in 
price-setting  games Alger [1987]  found that  prices fall to competi- 
tive  levels-and  often  below competitive  levels-in  markets  with 
four or more firms. 
Clearly, these  differences  are very stark.  Public  goods experi- 
ments  have been conducted by many researchers  at many different 
universities  and results  like those in Figure I have been accepted as 
robust.3  Similarly,  a body  of  evidence  on  markets  with  negative 
externalities  points to an equally robust collection of findings of the 
opposite sort. The next section will discuss a method for converting 
the  positive-externality  public  goods  experiment  to  an  identical 
decision  problem  with  a negative  externality  to  see  whether  this 
difference alone can explain part of the divergence  in these  results. 
III.  A  NEGATIVELY  FRAMED  PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENT 
The basic public goods experiment  used here is typical of those 
just described. Subjects play in groups of five. Each subject is given 
a budget  of 60  tokens.  Every  token  placed in the  private  good xi 
earns one cent for the subject, while every token given to the public 
2.  See Davis and Holt  [1992] for a discussion  and review of these  experiments. 
3.  See, for instance,  reviews by Davis and Holt [1992] and Ledyard [1994]. WARM-GLOW  VERSUS COLD-PRICKLE  5 
good gi  earns  one  half  cent  for  all  five  group  members.  Hence, 
subjects are induced to maximize  the payoff function, 
(1)  wi=Xi+A  +  I  gi, 
subject  to  the  budget  constraint  xi  +  gi  =  60.  This  is  how  this 
experiment  describes  a payoff function  of this  type in the  instruc- 
tions  to  subjects:4  "Every  token  you  invest  in  the  Individual 
Exchange will yield you a return of one. Every token invested  in the 
Group Exchange  will yield a return  of one half for every member of 
the group,  not just  the  person  who invested  it. It does not matter 
who  invests  tokens  in  the  Group  Exchange.  Everyone  will  get  a 
return  from  every  token  invested-whether  they  invest  in  the 
group  exchange  or  not."  Isaac  and  Walker  [1988]  and  Isaac, 
Walker, and Williams  [1990] use similar language in their subject's 
instructions:  "You will earn $0.01  for each token that you retain in 
your private account in any decision-making  round....  Each token 
placed in the  group  account  will generate  earnings  for the  entire 
group. Everyone  in the  group will receive the  same portion  of the 
earnings  from  the  group  account....  This  is  true  for each  indi- 
vidual regardless of the number of tokens that the individual places 
in the group account." 
These experimental  instructions  make it clear that an action of 
contributing  to the public good will generate  a positive  externality 
for other  subjects.  Notice,  however,  that  the  opportunity  cost  of 
investing  in the private good is that one did not invest  in the public 
good.  Hence,  saying  that  an  investment  in  the  public  good  will 
make others  better  off is equivalent  to stating  that  an investment 
in the private good will make others worse off. Mathematically,  the 
first  statement  can  be  converted  into  the  second  statement  by 
substituting  the  budget  constraint  of the  other  players, xj + gj= 
60, into the payoff function  (1): 
(2)  7i  xi +  2  i +  2  (60 -  xj) 
1  1 
=xi  +  -gi  -  xj +  120. 
Now the problem is framed as though  investing  in the public good 
has no external  benefit,  but investing  in the private good will have 
4.  Identical instructions  were used in Andreoni  [1988b,  1993b] 6  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
an external cost. Aside from this framing of the decision,  equations 
(1) and (2) have identical  payoff spaces.  In words,  this  framing  of 
the problem is expressed  this  way (complete  copies of instructions 
for both  conditions  can be found  in the Appendix):  "Every token 
you invest in the Individual Exchange will yield you a return of one. 
However,  each  token  you  invest  in  the  Individual  Exchange  will 
reduce the earnings of the other players by one half cent each...  . It 
will also be true that when the other members  of your group invest 
in the Individual Exchange then your earnings will be reduced by 1/2 
times  their  investment  in  the  Individual  Exchange....  Every 
token  you  invest  in the  Group Exchange  yields  a return  of  1/2  for 
you."  So  that  all  the  incentives  are  preserved,  subjects  in  this 
condition  must  also  be  given  120  each  round  in  "automatic" 
earnings.  Hence,  subjects  are  also  told:  "You will  also  get  auto- 
matic  earnings  each  round.  These  automatic  earnings  will  not 
depend  on  any  decisions  you  make,  and  will  be  the  same  each 
round. Your automatic  earnings  will be 120 each round." 
These instructions  have no effect on the incentives  of subjects; 
a self-interested  subject  still  has  a dominant  strategy  to free ride. 
The only effect is to frame the  actions  of the  subject as creating  a 
negative  externality  for the other subjects. The change in frames is 
similar to shifting  the point on the budget constraint  where people 
are endowed.  For  instance,  the  original  positive-frame  experiments 
suggest  that  the  game  is  beginning  with  all  the  tokens  already 
placed  in  the  private  good-Isaac,  Walker,  and  Williams  [1990] 
even  use  the  word  "retain"  to  describe  purchasing  the  private 
good-and  by moving them  to the public good all can be better  off. 
In  the  negative-frame  condition,  the  opposite  is  true.  The  frame 
suggests  that subjects are endowed with their opponents'  tokens  in 
the public good, that is the  120 of automatic  earnings,  which will be 
eroded only if subjects move the tokens  to the private good. 
This  describes  the  two  experimental  conditions  that  will  be 
examined  in  this  paper.  The  incentives  in  the  conditions  are 
identical,  and  the  two  differ  only  by  their  frame.  If  framing 
externalities  as  positive  can  explain  why  we  observe  much  more 
cooperation in public goods experiments  than in other experiments 
with  negative  externalities,  then  we  should  expect  the  positive- 
frame experiments  to be more cooperative than the negative-frame 
experiments.  The  next  section  discusses  the  results  of  these 
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IV.  EXPERIMENTAL  RESULTS 
Forty  subjects  are  used  in  each  condition,  for  a  total  of  80 
subjects  used  in  this  experiment.  The  data  are  collected  in  two 
separate sessions.  To conduct one session,  40 subjects are recruited 
from  intermediate  level  economics  classes  and  are  randomly  di- 
vided into two rooms of 20 each. In each room a different condition 
of  the  experiment  is  conducted.  This  is  done  to  maintain  the 
greatest  control  over  random  assignments  to  conditions.  In  a 
particular  room  the  subjects  are  again  randomly  assigned  to 
numbered  desks.  They  are given  instructions  and a packet  of ten 
"investment  decision  forms,"  which  subjects  use  to  record their 
decisions.  One computer and printer is in the back of each room. In 
each  iteration  of  the  game,  the  experimenter  collects  a decision 
form from each subject and types the subject number  and decision 
into  the  computer.  The computer  then  randomly  assigns  subjects 
to groups of five, calculates  payoffs, and prints an "earnings  report 
form"  for each  subject.  These  reports  are then  returned  to  each 
individual.  The  earnings  report  tells  subjects  their  investment 
decision,  the  group's  investment  in  the  public  good,  and  their 
monetary  earnings.  All  of the  parameters  of the  experiment  are 
known  to all subjects,  but the information  on individual  payoffs is 
all  private.  The  subjects  play  the  game  for  ten  rounds,  and  are 
randomly assigned  to new groups each round.5 This is important  in 
order to avoid the  possibility  of reputation  building.  Each experi- 
ment  lasted  about  50 minutes,  with  average earnings  of $8.24  per 
subject. 
Table I lists the percent of the endowment  subjects contribute 
to the  public good each round.  The  first thing  to note  is that  the 
results  from  the  positive-frame  condition  are very  similar  to  the 
results  described  in  Section  II.  Contributions  start  out  at  47 
percent  and  decay to  21  percent,  which  is  very  similar  to  nearly 
identical  experiments  run  by Andreoni  [1988b,  1993b].6  Overall 
5.  Group  assignments  are  made  on  a purely  random  basis  by the  computer 
program. 
6.  Andreoni  [1988b]  found cooperation  starting  at 51 percent  and falling to 24 
percent,  and Andreoni  [1993b]  found  a 56 percent  to 26 percent  range.  Also  note 
that  the  averages  in the  early iterations  of the  second positive-frame  condition  are 
somewhat  lower than  typical results,  although  this  difference  disappears by round 
4. Looking at this  more carefully  with  a Mann-Whitney  rank-sum  test,  we find no 
significant  difference  between  the  two  sessions  of  the  positive-frame  condition 
(z =  0.216).  To  the  extent  that  the  positive  2  condition  is  less  cooperative  than 
expected, however,  it will work against  the hypothesis  of significant  framing effects. 
The statistical  tests  compare subjects' average choices over the experiment. 8  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
TABLE I 
PERCENT  OF  ENDOWMENT  CONTRIBUTED  TO  THE  PUBLIC  GOOD  PER  ROUND 
Round 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  All 
Positive  1  58.3  62.9  52.5  32.9  42.9  34.2  19.8  27.5  27.5  18.6  37.71 
Positive  2  36.7  34.3  35.8  32.5  30.0  35.5  22.8  23.8  19.8  23.3  29.44 
Average  47.5  48.6  44.2  32.7  36.5  34.8  21.3  25.6  23.7  20.9  33.58 
Negative  1  22.9  25.7  17.8  19.2  11.0  10.3  14.5  15.6  16.2  2.1  15.53 
Negative  2  32.7  22.6  18.3  19.7  21.3  18.3  18.4  10.3  7.3  0.0  16.88 
Average  27.8  24.1  18.1  19.5  16.1  14.3  16.5  12.9  11.7  1.0  16.20 
Difference  19.7  24.5  26.1  13.3  20.3  20.5  4.9  12.7  12.0  19.9  17.38 
cooperation  is  34  percent.  Comparing  this  with  the  negative-frame 
condition,  we  see  that  the  difference  is  quite  striking.  There 
cooperation  begins  at just  27  percent  of  the  endowment,  and  decays 
to  only  1 percent  by  round  10.  Overall  cooperation  is  16.2  percent, 
which  is  half  the  level  of  the  positive-frame  condition.  On  average, 
the  subjects  in  the  negative  frame  condition  contribute  48.2 
percent  as  much  as  the  positive-frame  subjects. 
We  can  examine  the  significance  of  this  difference  by  using  a 
Mann-Whitney  rank-sum  test.  This  test  organizes  the  data  by 
subjects  and  is  normally  distributed.7  The  test  statistic  has  a value 
of  z  =  3.44  which  is  significant  beyond  the  ax <  0.001  level.  This 
means  that  the  positive  frame  significantly  increases  the  amount  of 
the  endowment  contributed  to  the  public  good.8 
We  can  also  look  at  the  effect  framing  has  on  the  propensity  of 
subjects  to  free  ride.  Table  II  lists  the  percent  of  subjects  choosing 
the  dominant  strategy  of  free  riding  during  each  iteration  of  the 
game.  Again  the  differences  are  quite  dramatic.  The  positive-frame 
starts  with  30  percent  of  subjects  free  riding,  rising  to  42.5  percent 
by  round  10,  with  a  ten-round  average  of  34.5  percent.  In  the 
negative-frame,  47.5  percent  of  the  subjects  free  ride  in  round  1. 
This  is  a  higher  percentage  of  free  riding  than  the  positive-frame 
subjects  reach  over  the  course  of  the  entire  experiment.  The 
7.  This  test  is conducted  by first  calculating  the  mean  contribution  level  for 
each subject and then  ranking  subjects  by these  means  in the joint  sample.  Under 
the null hypothesis  of no difference between  conditions,  the sum of the ranks should 
be equal across conditions.  See Freund [1971],  pp. 347-49. 
8.  If  we  look  at  data  only  from  the  first  round,  which  will  guarantee 
independence  of the  observations,  the  result  still  holds.  Here z  =  2.174  which  is 
highly significant. WARM-GLOW  VERSUS COLD-PRICKLE  9 
TABLE  II 
PERCENT OF SUBJECTS CONTRIBUTING  ZERO TO THE PUBLIC GOOD PER ROUND 
Round 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  All 
Positive  1  20  15  20  40  30  35  35  40  40  50  32.5 
Positive  2  40  35  35  35  35  30  45  40  35  35  36.5 
Average  30.0  25.0  27.5  37.5  32.5  32.5  40.0  40.0  37.5  42.5  34.5 
Negative  1  50  45  45  50  60  70  55  65  65  80  58.5 
Negative  2  45  65  65  60  60  70  70  75  75  100  68.5 
Average  47.5  55.0  55.0  55.0  60.0  70.0  62.5  70.0  70.0  90.0  63.5 
Difference  17.5  30.0  27.5  17.5  27.5  37.5  22.5  30.0  32.5  47.5  29.0 
negative-frame  subjects  continue  to  increase  free  riding  until 
round  10 when  90  percent  of the  subjects  free  ride.  On average, 
63.5  percent  of  negative-frame  subjects  free  ride  in  any  round, 
which  is  nearly  twice  the  rate  of  positive-frame  subjects.  The 
difference between  the positive  and negative  frames also increases 
over the course of the experiment.  Over rounds 1 to 5 the difference 
averages  24 percent,  and in rounds  6 to  10 the  average difference 
increases  to 34 percent. 
We can again examine  this  difference statistically.  The Mann- 
Whitney  rank-sum  test  yields  a  z  =  3.50,  which  is  significant 
beyond the  ax <  0.001  level. As above, the  negative  framing  of the 
public goods problem significantly  reduces the level of cooperation.9 
A simple  hypothesis  for this  difference  is that  somehow  the 
negative-frame  condition  makes  the  incentives  clearer  to  the 
subjects.  To  check  this,  a  post-experiment  questionnaire  was 
administered  to  test  subjects'  understanding  of  the  incentives. 
Subjects were given two hypothetical  situations  and were asked to 
state  what  choices  on  their  part  would  maximize  their  payoffs. 
Only one subject  (in the  Positive  1 session)  failed to answer  these 
questions  correctly.  Hence,  it  seems  unlikely  that  a difference  in 
understanding  of  the  incentives  could  account  for  the  patterns 
observed. 
In summary,  this  experiment  finds a rather  substantial  effect 
of positive  and negative  framing  on cooperation.  Even though  the 
incentives  of the  experiment  are identical  in  the  two  conditions, 
9.  If we  look  at  the  data  only  from  round  1, again  to  assure  independence 
among  the  observations,  the  difference  is  significant  with  a one-sided  t-test,  t  = 
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framing the choice as a positive  externality  substantially  increases 
cooperation  over framing the decision as a negative  externality. 
V.  How  IMPORTANT  ARE NEGATIVE 
AND POSITIVE  FRAMING  EFFECTS? 
Given the perhaps surprisingly  strong  significance  of positive- 
and negative-framing  effects on cooperation,  we must  ask how this 
result  will  affect  our thinking  about  experiments  with  externali- 
ties,  and  how  this  result  will  help  shape  our  understanding  of 
altruistic  behavior both inside and outside the laboratory. 
Perhaps  the  fundamental  first  question  to ask is how experi- 
mental science would have interpreted  the evidence on free riding if 
we had only seen the findings  on the negative-frame  condition just 
presented.  Could  these  results  be  taken  as  evidence  for  the 
Nash-equilibrium  free  riding  prediction?  In  the  negative-frame 
experiments  the amount  invested  in the private good deviates from 
equilibrium  by 16.2 percent  overall and 11.3 percent  over the  last 
five rounds.  On average,  36.5  percent  of subjects  fail to adopt the 
dominant  strategy,  and 27.5  percent  fail to do so over the last five 
rounds.  Nonetheless,  the  Nash-equilibrium  prediction  is  almost 
perfectly  met in the final round of the game. While the evidence  is 
not  as favorable  toward  Nash  equilibrium  as it is  in  many  other 
experiments,  one could reasonably  conjecture  that  if public goods 
experiments  had been judged by the  results  of the  negative-frame 
condition there may not have been such an important  puzzle. 
The  fact  remains,  however,  that  cooperation  in public  goods 
games is significant,  and the positive  frame of the game appears to 
be an important  factor in this result. This level of cooperation is not 
a mere experimental  fluke, but appears to be a fundamental  part of 
human  interactions  in  these  games.  The  current  experiment 
reveals  that  the  positive  frame  of  the  game  triggers  certain 
behaviors that  are not activated to the same degree by framing the 
decision  as  a negative  externality.  This  raises  further  questions 
about  the  motivations  of subjects  and revisions  of the  theoretical 
models that may be necessary  to describe these  and related results. 
Many  previous  experiments  have  found  behavior  that  is 
consistent  with various altruistic  motives  on the parts of subjects.10 
10.  See,  for  instance,  Palfrey  and  Rosenthal  [19881,  McKelvey  and  Palfrey 
[1992],  Palfrey  and Prisbrey  [1992],  Dawes  [1980],  Andreoni  [1993a,  1993b],  and 
Andreoni and Miller [1993],  among others. WARM-GLOW  VERSUS COLD-PRICKLE  11 
One  hypothesis,  which  could  be  called  pure  altruism,  is  that 
subjects care about the payoffs of the other subjects. An alternative 
is that  subjects  care about  the  act of doing good for other  people. 
This  motive  has  been  called  impure  altruism  or  "warm-glow" 
giving  [Andreoni  1989,  1990].  While  there  is  no  theory  for  the 
disutility  individuals  may get from the act of doing bad, an analog 
to the warm-glow is, naturally  enough,  the "cold-prickle." 
To explain  the  data presented  in this  paper, it is obvious  that 
our theories  must go beyond an assumption  of pure altruism.  Since 
the payoff space is identical  for both frames,  caring only about the 
payoffs of other players is not sufficient  to generate  the differences 
observed.  Note  also  that  simply  caring  about  the  changes  in the 
levels  of an  opponent's  payoff is  not  sufficient  either,  since  such 
changes  are affected equally  well in both  frames.  Instead,  it must 
be  that  the  perceived  sign  of  the  change  is  also  important,  and 
moreover,  the  strength  of the  warm-glow  from  doing  good must 
exceed that of the cold-prickle from doing bad. Stated differently,  it 
must  be that people enjoy doing a good deed more than  they enjoy 
not doing a bad deed. 
VI.  COMPARISON  WITH  OTHER FRAMING  EFFECTS  AND RELATED 
LITERATURE 
One may ask whether  the findings in this paper have anything 
in  common  with  other  settings  in  which  the  presentation  of the 
game has an effect. These other effects generally do not involve any 
interdependence  between  subjects of the sort found in public goods 
experiments,  but instead  relate to an isolated choice by the subject. 
These  include,  for  instance,  preference  reversals  and  Prospect 
Theory.  Some  effects,  such  as  asymmetric  loss  aversion  and  the 
willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-accept  paradox,  have  some  fea- 
tures  in  common  with  the  result  of  this  paper  in  that  they  pit 
positive  changes  against  negative  ones.  Perhaps  there  is a funda- 
mental  psychological  principle  that  switches  a person's  problem- 
solving  strategy  when  the  changes  considered  are negative  rather 
than positive,  and such a potential  could merit further research. 
In the  psychology  literature  there  has  been  some  interest  in 
comparing  the  effect  of  positive  and  negative  frames  in  various 
social  dilemmas,  some  of  which  are  similar  to  the  public  goods 
problem.  Unfortunately,  the  results  are inconclusive.  The  experi- 
ment  that  is  most  like  the  one  examined  here  is  Schwartz-Shea 
[1983].  In a single-shot  game of public goods, she found 85 percent 12  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
cooperation,  significantly  higher  than  the  65 percent  cooperation 
in the public "bads" experiments.  This clearly supports the results 
of this  paper. Other psychological  experiments  that  I am aware of 
are not strictly  comparable to the one reported here. One reason is 
that  they  did  not  present  neutral  environments.  In  particular, 
these  experiments  instructed  subjects  to  "give  some"  in positive 
frames  and  to  "take  some"  in  negative  frames,  which  could 
influence  outcomes.  A  second  problem  is  that  many  of  these 
experiments  gave false  feedback  to subjects  about  their  partner's 
choices.  A third  difficulty  is  that  the  games  often  had  step-level 
payoffs or "provision  points"  which  generated  Nash  equilibria  at 
cooperative  outcomes.  It  is  well-known  that  provision  points 
greatly  enhance  the  likelihood  of reaching  such  cooperative  out- 
comes,  which  should  work  against  finding  significant  differences 
(see  Bagnoli  and  McKee  [1991]  and  Davis  and  Holt  [1993]). 
Nonetheless,  of the  six other  psychological  studies,  one  is consis- 
tent  with  this  paper, four find no significant  effect,  and one finds 
slightly  more cooperation  in the take-some  condition.1" 
In  other  related  work,  psychologists  and  decision  scientists 
have  identified  a  strong  effect  of  the  "status  quo"  in  decision 
making  that  appears  to  be  driven  by  a bias  toward  "omission" 
rather than "commission"  of an act.12  If the outcome of an action is 
uncertain,  then people tend to refrain from that action. However, if 
the  consequences  of  the  action  are  positive,  people  feel  much 
happier  from  having  taken  action  than  if  the  consequences  are 
negative  and the same result occurs.13 This last effect could help us 
understand  what was observed here.  If people invest  in the public 
good in the positive-frame  condition,  they may see the outcome as a 
positive one in which many others cooperated as well. However, the 
same  outcome  in the  negative-frame  condition  may be  seen  as  a 
negative  one,  since  many  people  invested  in  private  good  to  the 
detriment  of  others.  Hence,  the  same  level  of  cooperation  may 
make  people  happier  in  the  positive-frame  than  in  the  negative- 
frame  condition.  This  could  in  turn  lead  to  more  sustained 
cooperation,  as was observed. 
Finally,  one  can  conjecture  about  how  these  static  asymme- 
11.  The  finding  of Allison  and Messick  [1985]  are consistent  with  this  paper, 
the  results  of Brewer  and Kramer  [1986]  are not,  and  no significant  effects  were 
found  by Schwartz-Shea  and Simmons  [1985],  Rutte,  Wilke, and Messick  [1987], 
Fleishman  [1988],  and Messick, Allison, and Samuelson  [1993]. 
12.  See,  e.g.,  Samuelson  and  Zeckhauser  [1988],  Kahneman,  Knetsch,  and 
Thaler [1990], and Ritov and Baron [1992]. 
13.  See Kahneman  and Tversky  [1982] and Landman  [1987]. WARM-GLOW  VERSUS COLD-PRICKLE  13 
tries  may  be  influencing  the  dynamic  of  these  games.  Moral 
philosophers  conjecture that "social inhibition"  or shared responsi- 
bility  may  make  it  easier  for  people  to  avoid  regret  when  bad 
outcomes  occur,  and  psychological  studies  seem  to  confirm  this 
view.14 If an action  is  described  as being  associated  with  the  bad 
outcome,  as  it  is  in  the  negative-frame  condition,  then  the  guilt 
from taking that  action may be diminished  the more the others  do 
the  same.  In contrast,  the  pride one  takes  in choosing  the  action 
that  creates  the  positive  externality  may  not  be  diminished  if 
others also do not choose the positive  action. This could also lead to 
faster  convergence  to  the  equilibrium  among  the  negative-frame 
subjects, as was observed. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This  paper has identified  what  could be called an asymmetric 
marginal utility  of helping.  People are significantly  more willing to 
cooperate in a public goods experiment  when  the problem is posed 
as a positive  externality  rather  than  as a negative  externality.  In 
fact, when the positive  externality  is rephrased to be presented  as a 
negative  externality-even  though  the incentives  do not change- 
the provision of the public good converges to the dominant  strategy 
Nash  prediction  after  ten  iterations  in  almost  all  cases.  This 
suggests  that  cooperation  in public  goods  experiments  cannot  be 
explained by pure altruism  that  subjects  may have for each other, 
since opportunities  for this altruism  are the same regardless of the 
frame. Instead,  there  must  be some  asymmetry  in the way people 
feel personally  about  doing good for others  versus  not  doing bad: 
the warm-glow must be stronger than the cold-prickle. 
While  more  work  obviously  needs  to  be  done  before  we  can 
state  firmly  that  an  asymmetry  between  positive  and  negative 
externalities  is  generalizable  to  other  aspects  of human  interac- 
tions,  we  can  assess  whether  such  a  conclusion  is  intuitively 
appealing.  One place to look for an effect of the asymmetry  may be 
in the  actions  of fund-raisers  and in the  advertisements  of chari- 
table organizations.  It seems  much  more common  to hear appeals 
to  the  virtue  that  one's  contribution  will  do  rather  than  to  the 
tragedies  that  will occur if a contribution  is not made.  Some  even 
appeal directly to the good feeling to be had by contributing.  If such 
a positive-negative  asymmetry  exists,  it  may  have  taught  fund- 
14.  See Wilson [1993, pp. 35-40]  for a discussion  of these  issues. 14  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
raisers  that  positive  appeals  are  more  productive  in  generating 
contributions  to public goods. 
APPENDIX:  SUBJECTS'  INSTRUCTIONS 
Al.  Negative  Frame 
Subjects'  Instructions. 
WELCOME. 
This experiment  is a study of group and individual investment 
behavior.  The instructions  are simple.  If you follow them  carefully 
and make good investment  decisions,  you may earn a considerable 
amount  of money. 
The money you earn will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of 
the experiment.  A research  foundation  has provided the funds  for 
this study. 
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MAKING  CASH  EARNINGS  FROM  YOUR  INVESTMENT  RETURN 
In  this  experiment  you  will  make  a series  of  10 investment 
decisions.  For  each  investment  decision  you  will  be  placed  in  a 
group  with  five  other  subjects.  Your  investment  returns  will 
depend  on  the  investment  decision  that  you  and  the  other  four 
members of your group make. 
Each  investment  decision  you  make  will  result  in  an invest- 
ment  return.  Your  investment  return  from  each  decision  will  be 
turned  into  cash  earnings.  In particular,  your  investment  return 
will equal  your  earnings  in the  experiment.  For example,  if your 
investment  return  from  one  investment  decision  is  95,  your 
earnings  will  be  $.95,  and  if your  investment  return  is  65,  then 
your earnings  will be $.65. 
In the  following  pages,  we will describe  how your investment 
returns  are determined. 
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THE INVESTMENT  OPPORTUNITIES 
You have been assigned  to a group of 5 people. Each of you will 
be given an investment  account with 60 tokens  in it. 
You will be choosing  how to divide your  tokens  between  two 
investment  opportunities: 
1. The  Individual  Exchange 
Every  token  you  invest  in the  Individual  Exchange  will yield 
you  a  return  of  one.  However,  each  token  you  invest  in  the 
individual exchange will reduce the earnings of the other players by 
one half cent each. This is best illustrated  with some examples. 
Example.  Suppose  you  invested  60  tokens  in the  Individual 
Exchange.  Then you would get a return  of 60 from this  exchange. 
However, each of the four other members of your group would have 
their earnings  reduced by 30 each. 
Example.  Suppose  you  invested  30  tokens  in the  Individual 
Exchange.  Then you would get a return  of 30 from this  exchange. 
However, each of the four other members of your group would have 
their earnings  reduced by 15 each. 
Example.  Suppose  you  invested  0  tokens  in  the  Individual 
Exchange.  Then  you  would  get  no  return  from  this  exchange. 
Likewise,  the  other  four members  of your  group would  not  have 
their earnings  reduced. 
It will also be true that when the other members  of your group 
invest  in  the  Individual  Exchange,  then  your  earnings  will  be 
reduced by  1/2 times  their  investment  in the  Individual  exchange. 
This is illustrated  below: 
Example.  Suppose that the other four members  of your group 
invested  a total of 100 in the Individual Exchange.  Then this would 
reduce your earnings by 50. 
Example.  Suppose that the other four members  of your group 
invested  a total of 90 tokens  in the Individual Exchange.  Then this 
would reduce your earnings by 45. 
Example.  Suppose that the other four members  of your group 
invested  no tokens  in the  Individual  Exchange.  Then  this  would 
not reduce your earnings  at all. 
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2. The  Group Exchange 
Every token you invest  in the Group Exchange  yields a return 
of 1/2  for you. The other members  of your group are not affected by 
your investment  in the Group Exchange. 
Example.  Suppose that you decided to invest  no tokens  in the 
Group  Exchange.  Then  your  return  from  the  Group  Exchange 
would be 0. 
Example.  Suppose  that  you invested  30 tokens  in the  Group 
Exchange. Your return from the Group Exchange  would be 15. 
Example.  Suppose  that  you  invested  50 tokens  in the  Group 
Exchange. Your return from the Group Exchange  would be 25. 
Automatic  Earnings 
In  addition  to  the  earnings  you  accumulate  from  the  Indi- 
vidual  Exchange  and  the  Group  Exchange,  you  will  also  get 
automatic  earnings  each round. These  automatic  earnings  will not 
depend  on  any  decisions  you  make,  and  will  be  the  same  each 
round.  Your  automatic  earnings  will  be  120  each  round.  Hence, 
your  total  earnings  each  round  will  be  your  earnings  from  the 
Individual Exchange  plus your earnings  from the Group Exchange 
plus 120 in automatic  earnings. 
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THE INVESTMENT  DECISION 
Your task is to decide how many of your tokens  to invest  in the 
Individual  Exchange  and  how  many  to  invest  in  the  Group 
Exchange.  You  are  free  to  put  some  tokens  into  the  Individual 
Exchange  and some  into  the  Group Exchange.  Alternatively,  you 
can put all of them into the Group Exchange  or all of them into the 
Individual Exchange. 
YOUR INVESTMENT  ACCOUNT 
You and every other member of your group will have 60 tokens 
in your investment  account each decision round. The total number 
of tokens  in each group in every decision round is 300. WARM-GLOW VERSUS  COLD-PRICKLE  17 
STAGES OF INVESTMENT 
There will be 10 decision  rounds in which you will be asked to 
make investment  decisions. At the end of each round your earnings 
will be recorded by the experimenter.  After the last round you will 
be paid the total of your earnings  from all 10 rounds. 
At  the  beginning  of  each  round  you  will  be  given  a  fresh 
investment  account  with  60  tokens.  You  will  also  be  given  an 
INVESTMENT  DECISION  FORM. You  are to  record your  deci- 
sion  using  this  form.  Be  sure  that  your  investment  in  the  Indi- 
vidual  Exchange  plus  your  investment  in  the  Group  Exchange 
equals  60,  i.e.  the  number  of tokens  in your  account.  You  must 
make your investment  decisions  without  knowing  what the others 
in your group are deciding. 
Do not  discuss  your  decision  with  any  other  participant! 
The experimenter  will collect the form when you have filled it 
out.  The  experimenter  will  then  calculate  your  return  from  the 
Individual  and  Group  Exchanges,  and  calculate  your  cash  earn- 
ings.  This  information  will be conveyed  to you on an EARNINGS 
REPORT. 
IMPORTANT  NOTICE:  The  Earnings  Report  tells  you  the 
total investment  in the  Group Exchange,  your investment  return, 
and your cash earnings. Your Earnings  Report does not tell you the 
investment  decisions  or earnings  of  the  other  members  of your 




The composition  of your group will be changing  every  decision 
round. After each decision round you will be reassigned  to a new 
group  of  5 participants.  The  5  group  members  will  never  have 
been members  of the same group in the past. 
At no point  in the  experiment  will the  identities  of the  other 
members of the group be made known to you, nor will your identity 
be made known to them. 
YOUR CASH EARNINGS 
Remember, your cash earnings  from each investment  decision 
will  equal  your  investment  return.  For instance,  if you  earn  100 18  QUARTERLY  JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
from your investment  decision,  your earnings  will be $1.00.  If you 
earn 50 from your investment  decision,  your earnings  will be $.50. 
GOOD LUCK! 
You  may  begin  by  completing  the  first  Investment  Decision 
Form. 
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A2.  Positive  Frame 
The  positive  frame  instructions  are identical  to the  negative 
frame, except for pages 3 and 4, which are provided below. 
THE INVESTMENT  OPPORTUNITIES 
You have been assigned to a group of 5 people. Each of you will 
be given an investment  account with 60 tokens  in it. 
You will be choosing  how to  divide your tokens  between  two 
investment  opportunities: 
1. The  Individual  Exchange 
Every  token  you  invest  in the  Individual  Exchange  will yield 
you  a return  of  one.  The  other  members  of your  group  are  not 
affected by your investment  in the Individual Exchange. 
Example.  Suppose  you  invested  60  tokens  in  the  Individual 
Exchange.  Then you would get a return  of 60 from this exchange. 
Example.  Suppose  you  invested  30  tokens  in the  Individual 
Exchange.  Then you would get a return of 30 from this exchange. 
Example.  Suppose  you  invested  0  tokens  in  the  Individual 
Exchange.  Then you would get no return from this exchange. 
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2. The  Group Exchange 
Your return from the Group Exchange will depend on the total 
number  of tokens  that  you  and  the  other  four  members  of your WARM-GLOW  VERSUS COLD-PRICKLE  19 
group invest in the Group Exchange.  The more the group invests  in 
the Group Exchange,  the greater the return to each member of the 
group. 
Every token invested  in the Group Exchange yields a return of 
1/2  for each member of the group, not just  the person  who invested it. 
The process is best explained by a number of examples: 
Example.  Suppose  that you decided to invest  no tokens  in the 
Group Exchange,  but that the four other members  invested  a total 
of 100 tokens.  Then your return  from the  Group Exchange  would 
be 50. Everyone  else in your group would also get a return of 50. 
Example.  Suppose  that  you  invested  30 tokens  in the  Group 
Exchange  and that the other four members  of your group invested 
a total of 90 tokens.  This makes a total of 120 tokens.  Your return 
from the Group Exchange  would be 60. The other four members  of 
the group would also get a return of 60. 
Example.  Suppose  that  you invested  50 tokens  in the  Group 
Exchange,  but  that  the  other  four  members  of the  group  invest 
nothing.  Then  you,  and  everyone  else  in the  group,  would  get  a 
return from the Group Exchangeszf 25. 
As you  can see,  every token  invested  in the  Group Exchange 
will yield  a return  of one half for every member  of the  group, not 
just  the  person  who  invested  it.  It  does  not  matter  who  invests 
tokens  in  the  Group Exchange.  Everyone  will  get  a  return  from 
every token invested-whether  they invest  in the Group Exchange 
or not. 
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